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 Introduction
Wittgenstein’s treatment of private language in his later work, Philosophical 
Investigations (PI), has probably received more attention than any other as-
pect of his philosophy. Here Wittgenstein argues against a private language. 
Nonetheless, in his earlier work, Tractatus Logico–Philosophicus, there are 
some remarks about the possible existence of private language. Although 
the issue of language is not a central topic of this book, it is very important 
to clarify a relation between the world and our representation of it, because 
world, thoughts and propositions share similar logical forms. 
This paper will analyze a possible concept of private language argument 
in Tractatus Logico–Philosophicus (TLP), its interpretations, and Wittgen-
stein’s own interpretation in his later work Philosophical Investigations. We 
will offer our own interpretation of private language conception in TLP and 
connect it to contemporary linguistics.
Private Language Concept in Tractatus Logico–
Philosophicus
The following is the most relevant citation from TLP regarding the possibil-
ity of private language:
the world is my world, shows itself in the fact that the limits of the language (the 
language which only I understand) mean the limits of my world. (TLP 1922: 5.62)
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In short, the argument is as follows: the world is my world because only 
I have the perception of objects, relations, etc. in the way that I have. Every 
other person has different perception from mine. Everything in the world 
can be expressed by language (The proposition is a picture of reality. The 
proposition is a model of the reality as we think it is. TLP 1922: 4.01.). There-
fore, as I have my own picture of reality, which I express by language, I have 
a language that only I can entirely understand.
This idea is probably brought from Schopenhauer’s work, who also has 
a kind of private language argument. According to Schopenhauer, the world 
is my idea (Schopenhauer 2010), and language is used to describe our ideas. 
Namely, when we express something using language, we express our own 
view or mental concept, not an occurrence from the outside world. This 
Schopenhauer’s concept is very close to the one of Ferdinand de Saussure, 
the father of contemporary linguistics, who introduces the bilateral linguis-
tic sign. Every linguistic sign has two aspects which are inseparably con-
nected: the sound sequence or signifier (the level of expression), and the 
concept or signified (the level of meaning). 
It seems that Wittgenstein is not entirely aware of the ‘signified’ part of 
the linguistic sign, because in TLP he argues:
The name means the object. The object is its meaning. (TLP 1922 3.203)
According to this quote, a name is directly assigned to an object, and 
there is no indirect category of signified.
In TLP, Wittgenstein does not mention the term ‘private language’, but 
‘my language” and ‘language that only I can understand”. It is not complete-
ly clear from TLP what exactly the private language for Wittgenstein would 
be or if TLP contains private language argument or not. Here are a few open 
questions and possibilities:
• Does it have the same vocabulary as general language, but meanings 
are different, because everyone has a different perception (my per-
ception of a cat is somehow different from anybody else’s perception 
of a cat)?
• Does private language represent the origin of a language change that 
will, or will not, affect general language?
• What is the relation between private language and general language? 
Is private language the only language, or do we have both private 
and general language?
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Reaction on private language concept from TLP in 
Philosophical Investigations
The most famous paragraph for the argument against private language in 
Philosophical Investigations (PI) is as follows:
Now, what about the language which describes my inner experiences and which 
only I myself can understand? How do I use words to stand for my sensations?—
As we ordinarily do? Then are my words for sensations tied up with my natural 
expressions of sensation? In that case my language is not a ‘private’ one. Someone 
else might understand it as well as I.—But suppose I didn’t have any natural ex-
pression for the sensation, but only had the sensation? And now I simply associate 
names with sensations and use these names in descriptions.— (PI 2009 256.)
This argumentation can help us to better understand Wittgenstein’s con-
ception of ‘the language that only I can understand’ from TLP (1922 5.62). 
Although this argumentation goes the opposite way, the essential part is the 
sentence ‘my words for sensations tied up with my natural expressions of 
sensations’. Someone else could understand it as well, but in TLP, Wittgen-
stein will say: ‘in his own way’. 
Although this is not a topic of this paper, we just want to point out that 
in PI, the example with a beetle in a box (PI 2009 293) seeks to show that an 
objective judgment of private notions is not possible. According to Wittgen-
stein, the private notion of pain is like a beetle in a box. We all own a box 
and looking at our box we claim to know what a beetle is and how it looks 
like. But the problem is that none of us have access to someone else’s box, 
which means that we cannot be sure that we see the same beetle. After all, 
we cannot even verify if a beetle is in someone else’s box at all. Thus Witt-
genstein argues that if we construe the grammar of the expression of sensation 
on the model of ‘object and designation’ the object drops out of consideration 
as irrelevant (PI 2009 293) it has objective value only as an allusion to the 
general type.
Analysis of private language concept in TLP
Let us first see what we know about private language from TLP. Wittgenstein 
argued that the limits of my language mean the limits of my world (TLP 1922 
5.6). For further analysis of private language concept, it is important to put 
the concept of language in a relation to the concept of world.
Further, Wittgenstein argues that the world (the only world for us) is our 
world:
That the world is my world, shows itself in the fact that the limits of the language (the 
language which only I understand) mean the limits of my world. (TLP 1922 5.62.)
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This leads us to solipsism, which Wittgenstein stated himself:
Here we see that solipsism strictly carried out coincides with pure realism. (TLP 
1922 5.64.)
The concept of world is defined in the very beginning of TLP:
The world is the totality of facts, not of things. (TLP 1922 1.1.)
Therefore, language, and consequently, private language, belongs to the 
realm of facts. This is also clear from the last point in the TLP: Whereof one 
cannot speak, thereof one must be silent. (TLP 1922 7.)
Let us now discuss the status of language itself — do we have a gen-
eral language, or the only possible language is the private language? To an-
swer this question, it is necessary to elaborate what the concept of solipsism 
means to Wittgenstein. In TLP, it is not strictly defined. The most relevant 
point, 5.64, where we see that solipsism strictly carried out coincides with 
pure realism, is already mentioned. According to 5.64., it seems that nothing 
except what is included in our world is present in the world. In other words, 
everything that exists, exists only through the viewpoint of the subject. The 
subject’s presence is the only thing that is real, and his viewpoint is the only 
way of grasping the world. Therefore, the world is only my world.
Consequently, private language, or a language that only I can under-
stand, is also the only possible language. But does it mean that we cannot 
understand each other? Not exactly. To answer this question, let us first dis-
cuss the nature of the relation between language and logic and language and 
thought.
The propositions show the logical form of reality. (TLP 1922 4.1.2.1)
Therefore, everything that can be expressed, can be expressed following 
the rules of logic. This is something that is true for every subject. We can 
argue that our feeling of pain is private because no one can fully under-
stand how we feel it, even though this feeling is something that is, to some 
extent, common to all people. In any way, no one can teach another person 
about the nominal meaning of feeling, because you must feel it yourself, 
and then you can use some of the available terms for describing this feeling. 
Understanding someone else’s feeling will be possible only through direct 
experience of their feeling; however, such an experience is impossible. The 
example of feelings is the most understandable, but the same thing happens 
when a subject uses any other term for describing anything else. Each of us 
have our own experience, background, knowledge. This is also supported by 
Russell’s claim that feelings and images of memory cannot be, even theoreti-
cally, felt and observed by someone from the outside. (Russell 1912).
Accordingly, the idea of  a private language is that each individual word 
or statement concerning feeling has no practical, communicative, or social 
meaning, therefore being, in each individual case, an exclusive expression 
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of a meaning understandable only to the speaker in the speaker’s own, pri-
vate way.
According to TLP, meaning can be derived only from a proposition:
Only the proposition has sense; only in the context of a proposition has a name 
meaning. (TLP 1922 3.3)
This is consistent with one of the most famous claims of the later Witt-
genstein, that of the meaning as use (PI 2009).
The meaning of words can be learned just from their usage. The usage 
should be common because all subjects use the same set of words to catego-
rize all appearances in their lives. But it does not imply that they use them 
exactly as we have already mentioned earlier in this paper, as for Wittgen-
stein, the proposition is a picture of reality, but such a model of reality as we 
think it is (TLP 1922 4.01). 
 In order to be able to communicate with each other, it is essential for 
us to have a consensus of ordinary meanings. I.e., our language community 
must have an agreement about replicating world phenomena to a language.
4.063 But to be able to say that a point is black or white, I must first know under 
what conditions a point is called white or black; in order to be able to say ‘p” is 
true (or false) I must have determined under what conditions I call ‘p” true, and 
thereby I determine the sense of the proposition.
The world we perceive is a kind of unclear matter. All we have is a lim-
ited number of names. Each of them is represented by one circle, and some 
of the circles are overlapping. Each circle has different aspects of meaning 
that are included, but each language user will use it in his own way, and 
only he will know what the same name means to him.
To conclude, the language is general, but each of us have our own way of 
using it and understanding it. Therefore, we cannot speak about the private 
language argument in TLP. TLP contains arguments for a kind of solipsism, 
which implies that every subject can use the language in his own way.
Interpretations of private language in TLP
The private language in TLP and other parts of it have several interpretative 
problems as there are many interpreters. The differences between several 
interpretations make the entire concept of every interpretation to be contro-
versial. 
To interpret this part, it is very important to be aware of possible Rus-
sell’s influence on Wittgenstein’s solipsism. According to Russell, the only 
possible knowledge is knowledge by acquaintance. Because of that, I can 
only know myself and objects immediately given to me in acquaintance. 
This implies that I can have no knowledge of other–selves (Russell 1912).
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Two remarkable interpreters of private language argument in TLP are 
Cora Diamond (2000) and David Pears (1987).
Diamond claims that:
The Tractatus provides us with arguments against the Russellian idea of someone 
else’s private object, the beetle in Bismarck’s box. It lets us see that any such bee-
tle would have no role in language or thought, but it left unmolested the beetle 
in one’s own box. Russell’s conception of how we can think about things in the 
minds of others was subjected to a critique, but the Tractatus left unexamined a 
questionable conception of what it is for our words to be about things in our own 
minds. (Diamond 2000, p. 283)
Diamond emphasizes that a crucial feature of Wittgenstein’s account of 
the construction of complex propositions from elementary propositions is 
this: if I am to understand a non–elementary proposition, then the elemen-
tary propositions that go into its construction must themselves be proposi-
tions that I understand: they must be made up of names that I understand 
or could understand. 
I could understand a general proposition about toothaches. Nonetheless, 
I could not understand one of its instances, a singular proposition about Bis-
marck’s toothache. On Wittgenstein’s account, therefore, I cannot use gen-
eral sentences to identify by description an object that Bismarck can name, 
and I cannot. So, private objects in others’ minds can play no role in my 
language — by figuring in the truth conditions of my claims about others’ 
sensations. If there is a private language argument in the Tractatus, it de-
pends on the principle that one person cannot have names for other people’s 
private sensations. 
Nevertheless, we should distinguish the concept of naming from the 
concept of understanding. Although it is possible that we cannot under-
stand other peoples’ feelings, it does not mean (nor it is written in TLP) that 
we cannot name them. 
In 4.002, Wittgenstein wrote:
Language disguises the thought; so that from the external form of the clothes one 
cannot infer the form of the thought they clothe, because the external form of the 
clothes is constructed with quite another object than to let the form of the body be 
recognized. The silent adjustments to understand colloquial language are enor-
mously complicated.
Names are the same in one language, but this does not imply that par-
ticular language users use them in the same way. But, what is private here 
is the thought, and ‘the only language that I understand’ (TLP 1922 5.62) is 
connected to a way in which thoughts of an individual are represented in a 
language. 
On the other hand, Pears (1987) argues that Wittgenstein’s target is Rus-
sell’s discussion of privacy and acquaintance and his discussion of the self. 
According to him, Wittgenstein’s aim is to improve Russell’s position. Pears 
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writes that TLP 5.6 presents ‘a development of a thesis put forward by Rus-
sell’ to the effect that ‘the limits of my language will be a function of the 
simple objects with which I have achieved acquaintance through all senses’ 
(Pears 1987, p. 156). Nonetheless, Pears 5.6s mainly with respect to solip-
sism and Schopenhauer’s influence (that subject is not in the world, he is 
a limit of the world). Still, he does not focus on the possibility of private 
language.
Private language in contemporary linguistics
As pointed out by Harris (2001, p. 118), ‘linguistics is a term of no great 
antiquity’. Its emergence in nineteenth century, and then its development 
in twentieth century, was probably most affected by Ferdinand de Saussure 
and his Course of General Linguistics that was published posthumously in 
1916. His Course is now generally considered to be a turning point in twen-
tieth–century linguistics, to the extent that researching language in terms 
of linguistics at the same time meant being de Saussurean (Harris 2001, p. 
118). His distinction between classical philology and language inquiry later 
proved to be the moment of establishing contemporary linguistics as a sci-
ence and, although at first criticized, de Saussure’s work soon became the 
focal point of language research. 
De Saussure’s main contribution can be divided into three parts (de Sau-
ssure 1916, p. 20, Harris 2001, p. 119):
1) describing all known languages and their history;
2) finding language universals and formulating general laws common 
to all linguistic phenomena and
3) defining linguistics itself.
Considering the subject of this paper, there is little to no reason to deal 
with 1) and 3), so the focus here will be kept on 2). Furthermore, there are 
strong reasons not to think that describing all languages and their histories 
can represent a job well done considering all possible problems in doing so; 
from no scientific interest in some of the known languages due to the num-
ber of their speakers to the fact that many languages simply disappear due 
to lack of speakers in the first place, just to name a few. Also, defining lin-
guistics itself stands in no relation whatsoever to the language phenomena 
we are here dealing with. Although de Saussure anticipated Wittgenstein’s 
view of linguistic semantics and his rejection of traditional nomenclature 
model which claims that words are simply attached to the things existing 
in the world (Harris 2001, p. 129), the main question regarding relation be-
tween de Saussure’s and Wittgenstein’s work is the one concerning language 
universals and general laws. The reason behind making this a main ques-
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tion is they can represent the linguistic ground for rejecting the notion of 
private language and establishing language as one structure that governs 
our thoughts and enables communication within a certain language com-
munity, even if solipsism, the way Wittgenstein thought of it, was true. For 
de Saussure, private and general language can basically be connected with 
one of his characteristic dichotomies, that of language as general and speech 
as individual.
Language, as a system of linguistic habits, as denoted by de Saussure, or 
as a system of life forms, as denoted by the late Wittgenstein, depicts the pic-
ture of the world. Everything we perceive in the world, every object, every 
person, every situation in our daily life, is reflected in language. Our use 
of language signs, our habit of using them, as well as the rules of their use, 
seem like a tangible way of finding our way of comprehending the world, 
especially communicating with others. Language seems necessary for us to 
communicate with others and it is our map for navigating the world.
Hence de Saussure derives the claim that we have no sovereignty over 
language, but that it is imposed on us, as it is, unaltered and preserved for 
generations of our history. The language always appears as a legacy from a 
previous period. In fact, no society knows and has never known language 
other than as a product inherited from past generations and which must be 
accepted as it is.
Language as a system of signs in a particular human community is not 
the same as language activity or human language in general (language as a 
human ability), but is only one part of it. Language activity can be defined 
as the human ability to communicate with voice signs, involving complex 
physical activity and assuming a symbolic function. Linguistic ability thus 
encompasses the totality of linguistic phenomena and individual languages, 
and in a particular community it manifests itself in two ways: language as 
a system of signs and speech as the application of that system in the act 
of communication. While people acquire language ability from nature, lan-
guage is acquired in society and is conventional, and cannot be separated 
from speech. Language is an inventory of means (a system of vocabulary and 
grammatical signs) without which verbal communication is not possible, 
and as an abstract system of signs it potentially comes into the conscious-
ness of an individual who is the speaker of a particular linguistic communi-
ty. But language does not depend on the individual and no individual rules 
its totality. The language therefore belongs to the collective, it is possessed 
only by the mass of its speakers.
Speech is the individual application of language in the act of communi-
cation, or the individual realization of language. It involves numerous varia-
tions from individual to individual and from situation to situation, but must 
be realized according to the conventional rules of language as a system of 
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signs. Language is a product of society that an individual passively receives, 
and speech is an individual and immediate realization of individual will 
and intelligence. But there is a kind of paradox about this, which can be 
posed in the form of the following question: how do speakers continue to 
use language effectively when it is constantly changing? That is, what is 
actually general and what is individual — language or speech?
But de Saussure senses this problem. Therefore, he also talks about the 
variability of the linguistic sign, while he reveals time as the main factor 
of variability. Although on the one hand time ensures the permanence of 
language, as de Saussure points out, it has another effect, which seems to 
contradict the former — it changes linguistic signs. So when we refer to 
language as a system of linguistic habits being imposed on us, we have to 
acknowledge both changes in an abstract system of signs and in speech as 
particular and individual usage. But maybe, due to total language activity 
being a social and therefore conventional thing, we are safe to assume that 
individual change in speech can be interpreted as confirmation of language 
as general activity we cannot evade if we are supposed to communicate with 
other individuals. Granted, contemporary linguistics does not have to as-
sume anything like Wittgenstein’s solipsism with its strong implications 
against the possibility of true understanding of other individuals’ experi-
ences of the world or our experiences of the world being truly understood 
by them. However, it will advocate constant language variations triggered by 
all sorts of different social and economic reasons (age, social class, ethnic-
ity, etc.) that can manifest, again, in different language phenomena such as 
morphology, phonetics, syntax, semantics and pragmatics. Those variations 
can, but do not have to, lead to language changes while it is impossible not 
only to track but also to even claim that such language changes occur with-
out different variations triggered by socio–economic conditions of speakers 
(Labov 1972). So how does it work? Contemporary linguistics, inspired by, 
so to say, de Saussure hinting the problem, confirmed two levels of language 
activity with regard to language change (Aitchison 2001, p. 95): 
1) superficial level at which change is constant and that enables differ-
ent languages to deal with possible novelties, different experiences of 
the world and different roles its users want to play in their communi-
ties, again, depending on their backgrounds. It is possible to imagine 
individuals wanting to sound more educated or more prestigious. 
At this level ‘how changes occurred was closely linked to why” and 
speakers triggered it ‘sometimes consciously, at other times without 
realizing it” (Aitchison 2001, p. 96). And
2) deeper level that is connected with general ability to communicate 
at which ‘language maintains its patterns, and preserves efficient lin-
guistic interaction” (Aitchison 2001, p. 96).
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It may seem that the former belongs to individual speech and that the 
latter applies to an abstract language sign system but while we now have 
superficial and deeper level of language changes, it is still unknown what 
is to be considered as general or individual, mostly due to both levels being 
common to individual speakers which, again, all fall into the same category 
of arbitrary sign communicators. This becomes even clearer when we real-
ize that both levels can trigger language changes and that only some of those 
changes will actually occur: ‘But although social desires and cultural needs 
may trigger change, the changes triggered are ready to happen at a deeper 
level. Only certain changes are likely to occur” (Aitchison 2001, p. 104). 
Therefore, we must conclude there is only one language which shows both 
its mental and social existence with former being the one we completely un-
derstand and the latter being the communication form that we all share and 
that is, in a way, being imposed on us just as the abstract arbitrary system 
of signs. That being said, this short analysis of language change in contem-
porary linguistics confirms there is no true distinction between private and 
general language.
It is often claimed that one of the most influential and most cited re-
searchers in contemporary linguistics is Noam Chomsky (for interesting 
refutation of these claims that are even being referred to as a myth see Salkie 
2001, pp. 105–106). With acknowledging different stages of his generative 
grammar concept, here his ‘Standard theory” will be laid out and used to 
address the problem of private language existence. The reason behind in-
cluding Chomsky’s work is two–folded: 1) Chomsky’s concept of genera-
tive grammar is closely connected with de Saussure’s search for language 
universals and general laws that govern different natural languages and 2) 
Chomsky’s real influence in linguistics is maybe far smaller than it is widely 
accepted but his work still represents what may be considered as crucial 
influence in contemporary linguistics. That being said, together with de 
Saussure, Chomsky can be considered as the one searching for language 
universals and the one having a major, maybe even decisive, influence on 
forming contemporary linguistics and defining its problems. As such, his 
work represents legitimate linguistic ground upon which it should be pos-
sible to analyze the possibility of supposed Wittgenstein’s notion of private 
language.
While also dealing with ‘technical” questions such as how any natural 
language is stored in the brain and how it is being used, which manifests 
in one’s behavior, Chomsky’s central analysis of language (1957) is mainly 
concerned with the system of language knowledge and its appearance in 
one’s mind. Answering these two questions, namely how the system of lan-
guage knowledge works and how language then appears in one’s mind, is 
interconnected. Chomsky proposed the concept of generative grammar, that 
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is, a formal system that enables construction of infinite number of differ-
ent meanings and sentences using a finite number of words. But how is it 
accomplished? According to Chomsky, there are parts of our linguistic dis-
position that are innate or genetically built in and hardwired. As such, we 
must consider them being generally applicable to any natural language and 
sufficient proof of such claim should be the fact that we are not predisposed 
to learn any particular language. On the contrary, there is a portion of gram-
mar rules common to each potential language user. Consequently, language 
can either exist in the brain at birth via genes, or can be developed in the 
brain also via genes (Salkie 2001, p. 111). Of course, language acquisition 
in terms of acquiring words of particular natural language has nothing to do 
with biology, genes and innate structures, it is by no means nothing more 
than experience randomly generated by multiple factors such as geographi-
cal position, social class, education, etc. According to Chomsky’s explana-
tion, there is empirical evidence of different human endeavors that show 
plausibility of innate structures. Take for example the way humans learn to 
walk — there is empirically grounded order of rules followed by appropriate 
age of individuals — one is only at some point able to take certain locomo-
tory actions and that is exactly when one will actually strive to master them. 
With some degenerative cases taken into account, this will appear regularly 
across entire human population and, as such, it pinpoints biological origin 
of instructions essential for walking. As with walking, language activity fol-
lows the same rules and order, certain language activities will be developed 
at correlated age and with correlated brain abilities. That in turn means lan-
guage activity is also biologically determined and innate and therefore we 
must abandon empirical approach when asking where the language comes 
from. In terms of particular words and meanings, it is fine to keep empirical 
approach and focus on individual language acquisition. At this point, when 
it comes to dichotomy of private and general language existence it maybe be-
comes more obvious what we should consider to be universal structure and 
what falls down to individual properties of language. However, generative 
grammar concept tells us there is a general language structure under which 
all natural languages must fall and that exactly is the case with finite pos-
sibilities of constructing sentences that make sense. Natural language word 
acquisition depends on individual and contingent circumstances and, by 
being such, it allows infinite number of different word combinations. It may 
be the case that this is what gives linguistic foundation to Wittgenstein’s 
understanding of language as use and what may stand behind his pragmatic 
view of language characteristic for PI which replaced the one of logical at-
omism characteristic for TLP. But in regard to what has been said earlier, this 
does not bring us any closer to thinking that contemporary linguistics ap-
proves of private language concept such as the one that, according to some 
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of his commentators, could follow from Wittgenstein’s understanding of lan-
guage. There is nothing here that obliges us to the notion of private language 
instead of aforementioned solipsism — it is still the case that language is 
understood as a general structure under which all of individual use fall. By 
having private experiences, we are still left short of comprehending those 
experiences themselves together with complete understanding of language 
used to describe and explain the world in terms of our experience. What was 
pointed out here, both in the case of de Saussure and Chomsky, is that there 
is only one language that is universal in its structure and that is formed in a 
way that allows us communication. 
Conclusion
In this paper, we aimed to show that there is no private language argument 
in TLP. What is present there is that, because of solipsism, we use general 
language as a tool for expressing our own way of world capturing. This is 
the reason why nobody else can understand our language, as nobody else 
has the same way of seeing the world as we have. Nonetheless, we can com-
municate with other people because all of us (in our language community) 
use language as a frame in which all of us must fit in.
Further, there is no distinction between private and general language 
because the only language that we understand is also the only language for 
us. This is also noticeable in a paradox that comes from de Saussure’s di-
chotomy of language and speech, as the question is what is individual, and 
what is common.
By analyzing de Saussure’s and Chomsky’s approach connected to the 
topic of private language, we concluded that there is no room for private lan-
guage, just for a general language with a structure that allows communica-
tion in a language community. That seems to be very close to Wittgenstein’s 
idea expressed in TLP, especially with regard to his view of relation between 
language, logic and our thoughts — propositions show the logical structure 
of reality, both of which we cannot abide. Only in a context a name has a 
meaning which brings us just a step closer to language pragmatics to which 
he turned to in PI.
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Abstract
NOTION OF PRIVATE LANGUAGE IN WITTGENSTEIN'S 
TRACTATUS LOGICO-PHILOSOPHICUS AND SOME 
CONTEMPORARY LINGUISTIC REFUTATIONS
MARKO KARDUM, INES SKELAC
In this paper, the possibility of private language argument in Tractatus Logi-
co-Philosophicus is analyzed. The concept of ‘language that only I could un-
derstand” is connected to solipsism, or the impossibility to understand other 
people’s way of seeing the world. But all members of the same community are 
able to communicate using the same language, so this language is a general lan-
guage, and there is no private language, just a private perception of the world. 
Contemporary linguistic theories of Chomsky and de Saussure are close to this 
interpretation of private language.
KEY WORDS: Chomsky, general language, private language, de Saussure, solipsism, 
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Wittgenstein
